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“Once again, the key to turning the single market and globalization into opportunities is the
capacity to reform labor market and social policies in the right direction. Failing to do so would
only exacerbate the fear towards ‘Polish plumbers’ and delocalization” (Sapir, 2006).
The link between globalization and labor market regulations goes widely undisputed in the
literature and in the public debate. As the story goes, in a globalized world domestic employment
protection legislation becomes too costly, causing firms either to succumb to their internationales et d’Informations
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stress international institutions like the OECD and the International Monetary Fund put on labor
market reforms in the present financial crisis.1 The threat of delocalization, by reinforcing the trade-
off between job and employment security, is also a major driver in the political strive for labor market
reforms (Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2000).2 Indeed, the literature is quite concordant in finding a
negative impact of globalization on employment protection (Fischer and Somogyi, 2012). But is the
underlying presupposition that, with more rigid domestic labor markets, firms would move their
production abroad valid? The literature has identified high domestic unit labor costs as one of the
factors motivating firms’ choice to delocalize, but little effort has been devoted to test at a microlevel
whether more job stability fosters offshoring.3 In particular, no connections have been established so
far between the diffusion of flexible work arrangements by means of non-standard contracts and the
likelihood of offshoring. Our work provides a first empirical assessment of this link at the firm level. A
crucial difference between the macro- and the microperspective is that we focus on the actual use of
non-standard contracts (at the microlevel) rather than on the availability of such arrangements, as
measured for instance by the OECD employment protection legislation (EPL) index, which is defined
at the macrolevel. Therefore, we do not need much variation in the amount of protection granted to
workers for our empirical analysis: even in a constant institutional environment, we could exploit the
heterogeneity in firms’ behavior, and test whether individual firms consider cheap domestic labor as a
substitute for cheap foreign labor. The season of labor market reforms that has occurred in the past
two decades in OECD countries, which has opened the possibility to hire under less protected,
temporary contracts (Berton et al., 2012), introduces additional variation (and interest) into our
analysis. The share of temporary contracts (fixed term direct-hire employees) over dependent
employment was 13.7% in the EU27 in 2009 (up from about 8% in 1980), with figures as high as 18% in
the Netherlands, 22% in Portugal, 25.5% in Spain and 26.4% in Poland. Italy was about the EU average
at 12.5%. This share skyrocketed to above 40% in the EU27 for younger workers in the 15–24 age
bracket (France, Germany, Spain, Portugal and Sweden were at about 55%; Poland was at 62%; Italy at
44%).4 Given the shorter duration of temporary contracts with respect to open-ended ones, the
incidence of temporary contracts in hiring is even greater, with Spain reaching 80%. As in the past
decades globalization has also increased (OECD, 2010), it is legitimate to ask whether the use of
temporary workers acted as an amplifier or as a restrain to increased offshoring.
Intuitively, the impact of workforce composition on offshoring decisions is indeterminate. If firms
consider production offshoring and workforce flexibility as two different cost-cutting strategies,
then a higher share of temporary workers over total workforce should be associated with less
delocalization. Indeed, non-standard contracts, and in particular fixed-term work arrangements, do
entail lower dismissal costs (as no firing costs have to be paid upon expiration of the contract and in
many countries no end-of-services allowances are due) and, in many countries, also lower unitary
costs (Berton et al., 2012). The availability of such flexible work arrangements should therefore
decrease the appeal of delocalization to countries with low labor costs. Conversely, higher workforce
flexibility (in terms of a higher share of temporary workers) could facilitate offshoring, as domestic
production can be displaced abroad without bearing the high costs of permanent workers dismissal.
Such costs entail not only monetary payments to workers, but also increased opposition by labor
unions and more attention from the general public and the media, which might delay offshoring or
deter it completely.1 See for instance IMF (2012), Barkbu et al. (2012), and OECD (2012).
2 While in principle workers (and unions) might be in favor of labor market deregulation if they anticipate a higher chance
of finding a job once unemployed thanks to lower employment protection, most often they ask for more protection of existing
jobs at risk of delocalization (see Berton et al., 2012).
3 In this paper the term offshoring refers to the extent to which a firm performs part of its production abroad, either
through the setting up of arm’s length agreements with foreign firms (international outsourcing), such as licensing, or through
the establishment of (partly or fully) owned subsidiaries or affiliates abroad (FDI).
4 The crisis induced a decrease in the share of fixed-term contracts, as those were the first to be dismissed. The maximum
was achieved, in most countries, in 2007.
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ultimately to be addressed at the empirical level. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to
test this claim with firm-level data. Our results show that offshoring and labor flexibility are
negatively correlated. However, an issue can be raised concerning reverse causality (from a propensity
to future offshoring to a preference over actual workforce composition) and spurious correlation
(some firm characteristics affecting both the propensity to future offshoring and the actual workforce
composition). Indeed, we show by using appropriate instruments that once this endogeneity problem
is controlled for, the relationship between actual workforce composition and future offshoring
vanishes (whether the theoretical mechanisms at work discussed above are too weak or compensate
each other, we cannot tell).
The paper is structured as follows: the next section summarizes the literature on the determinants
of offshoring and the wage gap of temporary workers; Section 3 describes our empirical strategy and
Section 4 presents our main results. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes.2. Literature
The impact of offshoring on domestic labor force composition has been the focus of recent applied
research. Machikita and Sato (2011) and Matsuura et al. (2011) find that foreign direct investment
and/or outsourcing by Japanese firms tend to encourage the replacement of permanent workers with
temporary workers. Using German data Görg and Görlich (2012) show that temporary workers are
more affected by increasing offshoring in terms of wage reductions and higher probability of layoffs
than permanent workers. This result may be consistent with the weak bargaining power of temporary
workers and with manufacturers’ goal to save expected labor adjustment costs. Once the firm has
already incurred the setup cost for the foreign plant, more favorable foreign business opportunities
can be dealt with by dismissing temporary rather than permanent workers. Moreover, tougher
international competition may make the employment relationship fragile, reducing the workers’
incentive to accumulate firm-specific skills. Hence, the efficiency advantage of permanent workers
over temporary workers shrinks and firms prefer substituting permanent with temporary workers.5
Conversely, the determinants of offshoring have been extensively investigated, but to the best of
our knowledge there are no studies that include labor-force composition among the explanatory
variables.6 In general, there is broad consensus that the choice to offshore is mainly driven by two5 More in general, the effects of offshoring on labor market outcomes have been extensively studied (see Crinò (2009) for a
review). In a nutshell, offshoring may induce cost savings and improve productivity, resulting in higher output. Thanks to the
productivity-enhancing effect of offshoring, even factors of production whose tasks are offshored can benefit from the
international delocalization of production (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). The empirical evidence broadly supports this
view (Görg et al., 2008; Daveri and Jona-Lasinio, 2008; Hijzen et al., 2010; Jabbour, 2010). However, higher productivity comes
at the cost of higher demand elasticities for production workers (Sensen, 2010), increasing job instability (Geishecker, 2008; Lo
Turco et al., 2013), broadening wage inequality due to the increase in the relative demand for skilled workers (Feenstra and
Hanson, 1996,1999; Broccolini et al., 2011), and higher unemployment in presence of imperfect intersectoral labor mobility
(Mitra and Ranjan, 2010). As for what concerns non-production workers, the effects of offshoring are reported to depend on the
workers’ skills (the demand for high skills increases, while that for low skills decreases), as well as on other characteristics of
the foreign supplier (Tomiura et al. (2013), for Japanese firms).
6 Working on Japanese firms Tomiura (2005) shows that offshorers are larger and more labor-intensive than purely
domestic firms; moreover, they are more productive and perform more R&D. Similar results are found by Pelegrìn and Bolancé
(2011) for Spanish firms. Hyun (2010) confirms, for Korean manufacturers, that offshoring is more frequent among firms that
are larger, engage more in R&D, use more ICT, and have higher labor intensity, while he does not find an association with
productivity. Using French data, Corcos et al. (2013) find that intra-firm imports are more likely among highly productive,
capital-intensive and skill-intensive firms. The positive effect of productivity on offshoring decision for French firms is also
confirmed by Defever and Toubal (2013). Using Italian data, Cusmano et al. (2010) show that foreign business experience,
meaning that the firm has exported or undertaken FDI, being part of a business group and a large share of skilled workers are
positively correlated with the probability to offshore. On a different sample of Italian firms, Capasso et al. (2013) show that
offshoring is more likely among more productive and larger firms. Using a larger sample of European firms, Barba Navaretti
et al. (2011a, 2011b) find that larger, older, more productive, innovative and foreign-owned firms, as well as those hiring more
graduate and less blue-collar workers, are more likely to produce abroad than other firms. All these studies are based on cross
sectional data and they reports contemporaneous correlations about some firms’ characteristics and the likelihood to offshore.
For evidence at the industry level, see, for instance, Antras (2003), Yeaple (2006) and Marin (2006).
Please cite this article as: Presbitero AF, et al. Is labor flexibility a substitute to offshoring? Evidence
from Italian manufacturing. International Economics (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
inteco.2014.07.004
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proximity to final markets, in order to increase sales. Between those two motivations, the existing
evidence suggests that international outsourcing is primarily a cost-cutting strategy. The necessity to
reduce production costs has been extensively discussed with respect to the internationalization of the
commodity chains (Gereffi, 1999). In a comparative study on the international expansion strategies of
European firms from Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain and the UK, Barba Navaretti et al.
(2011a) find that FDI is more frequently used to support sales in foreign markets (a market-seeking
objective), whereas international outsourcing is predominantly used to delocalize production (an
efficiency-seeking objective). In a seminal study targeted at identifying the main drivers of
outsourcing (and offshoring) across 20 large European manufacturing groups, operational cost
savings have been identified as a predominant concern (Quélin and Duhamel, 2003).7 Dìaz-Mora
(2008) finds that the offshoring intensity is higher in sectors with higher unit labor costs. Using firm-
level data, Pelegrìn and Bolancé (2011) confirm the presence of cost-cutting strategies by offshoring
firms, since firms with worse operating performance and labor-intensive activities are more likely to
relocate part of their production abroad. Similarly, working on Italian firm-level data, Cusmano et al.
(2010) and Capasso et al. (2013) argue that offshoring is mainly driven by cost-efficiency reasons,
since most firms contract out labor intensive functions. That offshoring is mainly an efficiency-
enhancing strategy for Italian firms is also supported by a comparison of the internationalization
patterns of European firms from selected economies (Barba Navaretti et al., 2011a). The majority of
Italian firms (60.5%) producing abroad choose international outsourcing (an efficiency-enhancing
strategy) as an exclusive modality of international production (the highest percentage in the sample),
while only 34% of them choose FDI (the lowest in the sample, similar to France).
An alternative to employing cheap labor abroad is to reduce the wage bill at home by using
temporary contracts: this allows savings in terms of dismissal costs and – in many cases – also in
terms of unit (wage) costs.8 With respect to dismissal costs, temporary contracts permit a sort of
“employment at will” behavior of firms, as workers can be freely dismissed when the contract expires,
and contract durations are generally short (Berton et al., 2012).9 Moreover, in many countries no
dismissal costs are due to the worker upon expiration.10 On the contrary, firing an open-ended worker
generally requires a justification, which can be challenged by the worker and reversed by a labor
court, with the whole process taking time and money and adding to uncertainty. The threat of taking
the firm to the court often induces high voluntary dismissal payments even when they are not
envisaged by the legislation (this being the case of Italy at the time our data refer to). Moreover, upon
termination of the contract open-ended workers are often provided with end-of-service allowances.
The wage bill for non-standard contracts is also lower, as these contracts often entail lower social
contributions and wages are also lower due to a weaker bargaining position of fixed-term workers.
The European Commission estimates an average wage penalty for temporary contracts of 14.2%
(European Commission, 2011). This average masks strong heterogeneity among contracts and among
countries. For instance, in Germany temp agency workers appear to suffer from a more substantial
penalty: Oberst et al. (2007) estimate a wage gap of 29% for 2005, while Jahn (2008), after controlling
for observed and unobserved characteristics, places the penalty at 15–18%. By converse, the most
discriminated category in Italy is that of project workers,11 with a penalization of up to 25% in terms of
net wage and up to 50% in terms of gross wage. On the contrary, temporary contracts (fixed-term(footnote continued)
A related strand of literature discusses the determinants of outsourcing and production subcontracting (see, among others,
Girma and Gorg, 2004; Holl, 2008; Jabbour 2013).
7 A related strand of literature shows that labor and production costs affect the location choice decision of multinational
firms; see, for instance, Disdier and Mayer (2004) and Jabbour (2012).
8 Temporary contracts might also serve a screening purpose – see for instance Portugal and Varejão (2009). We do not
consider here the differences in productivity between temporary and open-ended contracts (Dolado et al., 2012; Lotti and
Viviano, 2012), which might compensate differences in labor costs. Note however that the same issue arises for workers in third
countries where production is offshored.
9 In facts, temporary contracts are less diffused in countries with a lower EPL for open-ended contracts, like the UK.
10 Dismissal payments, proportional to accrued seniority, are envisaged in some countries (e.g. France and Spain).
11 Wage and salary independent contractors in US parlance.
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ended contacts only insofar as they are characterized, as discussed above, by reduced dismissal costs
(Berton et al., 2012).3. Data and identification strategy
The data we use in the empirical analysis are drawn from the IX and X “Survey on Manufacturing
Firm” (SMF) administered every three years by Unicredit, a large banking group. The SMF is a large
survey of about 3800 Italian manufacturing firms with more than 10 employees and includes several
information on firms’ internationalization and labor force composition over a 3-year period. As
common in the literature (Cusmano et al., 2010; Hyun, 2010; Capasso et al., 2013; Corcos et al., 2013),
we classify firms using a binary variable that identifies offshorers as the firms who explicitly state that
they perform part of their production process abroad.12 As for labor force composition, the SMF
provides detailed information on the number of temporary and project workers at the firm level. The
sampling procedure creates a rotating panel so that around one-third of firms interviewed in 2003 are
still present in the 2006 wave. This limits the sample of firms present in both waves to about 1300.
Missing data and outliers in the main variables used in the analysis leave use with a trimmed data set
of 926 firms, observed both in 2003 and in 2006.13
A first look at the data of the X Survey on Manufacturing Firms confirms some of the indications of
the empirical literature about the drivers of offshoring. Firms’ choice to delocalize primarily follows a
cost-cutting strategy, since lower labor and input costs are indicated by, respectively, 49% and 21% of
offshoring firms as a main driver of delocalization decisions (22% of firms indicated proximity to the
output markets as another driver of offshoring). A descriptive analysis of the data reinforces the
opinion that domestic labor force flexibility and offshoring are substitutes, rather than complements
(Fig. 1). The variable on the vertical axes is respectively the share of firms that undertake part of their
production abroad in 2006 (OFFSHORING2006, left hand panel), and the share of firms who chose to
relocate part of their production abroad in the period 2003–2006 (right hand panel).14 The variable on
the horizontal axes is the share of temporary workers in 2003 (by deciles). Both diagrams show a
negative correlation between offshoring and temporary workers.
To identify the effect of labor flexibility on the firms’ decision to offshore beyond this descriptive
evidence, we estimate a model in which the probability of offshoring in 2006 (OFFSHORING2006) is a
function of the offshoring status in the previous wave (OFFSHORING2003), of the ratio of fixed-term
direct-hire employees over the total number of dependent employees (TEMPORARY2003), and of a set
of control variables measured in 2003 (X2003) in order to attenuate reverse causality and to allow for
possible lagged effect on the decision to offshore:
PrðOFFSHORING2006 ¼ 1Þ ¼ΦðOFFSHORING2003; TEMPORARY2003;X2003Þ ð1Þ
where Φ is the normal distribution function. The set of controls is based on the evidence about the
determinants of offshoring (see footnote 6) and includes firm size (SIZE, as the logarithm of the
number of employees in 2003), two dummies for innovative (INNOVATION, equal to one for firms
which introduced a product or a process innovation between 2001 and 2003) and exporting (EXPORT)
firms, a dummy for firms with a contraction in total sales between 2001 and 2003 (NEGATIVE SALES),
and an index of skill intensity, measured as the share of white collars (non-production workers) in12 The specific question is: “Does the firm currently undertake part of its production activity in another country?” The
survey does not provide a measure for the intensity of offshoring.
13 Data on the XI survey are not publicly available and hence we cannot merge them to our data set. Even if we could,
adding a newwave would create two problems. First, due to the rotating structure of the panel (and firm mortality), focusing on
firms observed in all three waves (a 9-year period) would further diminish sample size. Second, the relationship between
offshoring and temporary workers in the last wave is likely to be affected by the Great Recession, as temporary workers were
the first to be laid off.
14 To be more precise, the outcome variable in the right panel can take a value of þ1 if the firm had offshore activities in
2006 but not in 2003, a value of 0 if the firm either had offshore activities both in 2006 and in 2003, or neither in 2006 nor in
2003, and a value of 1 if the firm had offshore activities in 2003 but not in 2006.
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Fig. 1. Aggregate relationship between offshoring and labor force flexibility: (a) firms with offshoring activities in 2006 and
(b) firms who relocated in 2003–2006. Note: First and second deciles of the share of temporary workers are both 0; they are
thus grouped in the figures. The average value of the share of temporary workers for firms belonging to the decile 3 to 10 are
respectively 0.9%, 1.9%, 3.0%, 4.4%, 6.3%, 8.7%, 12.4%, and 40.4%. The outcome variable in the right panel can take a value of 1 if
the firm had offshore activities in 2006 but not in 2003, a value of 0 if the firm either had offshore activities both in 2006 and in
2003, or neither in 2006 nor in 2003, and a value of -1 if the firm had offshore activities in 2003 but not in 2006.
Source: Our elaboration on Survey on Manufacturing Firm (SMF) data, IX and X waves.
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presence of common shocks that may push firms working in the same region and/or industry towards
offshoring and/or labor cost cutting (e.g. increasing the use of temporary workers), and to allow for
the possibility that agglomeration effects and herd behavior might drive firms’ offshoring decisions in
local areas, we also add macro region (North-West, North-East, and Centre-South) times industry
dummies. Unfortunately, the structure of the data set does not allow for a greater degree of
granularity (e.g. region times industry dummies), as this would imply that many cells would be empty
(no variation in the dependent variable). Definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used in
the analysis are reported in Table 1.
The descriptive statistics tell us that 9% of Italian firms delocalized part of their activities in 2006.16
Offshoring status could be reversed (36.5% of offshoring firms in 2003 have foreign production in
2006), and it is more likely for firms that in 2003 were larger, exporters and innovative. Moreover,
delocalization is more frequent among firms with a larger presence of white collars, and with easier
access to credit and multiple banking relationships. Offshoring is also more likely amongst worse
performers (e.g. firms that experienced a contraction of total sales between 2001 and 2003), a fact
consistent with the choice of offshoring as driven by cost savings purposes. Finally, as described in
Fig. 1, firms that employed a larger share of temporary and flexible workers in 2003 were less likely to
offshore in 2006. These differences in the average probability of offshoring across firm’s characteristics
are generally statistically significant.
We start estimating Eq. (1) by a standard probit and a linear probability model. However, the
model could suffer from simultaneity and omitted variable biases. Even if the labor market flexibility
variable is predetermined, it could still be endogenous to the firms’ offshoring propensity. In fact, the
decision to delocalize part of the production process abroad in the near future could affect the current
composition of the labor force. This may result in an increase of the share of flexible contracts, to
facilitate the future offshoring process, or to a reduction of temporary workers, if firms see the
expected delocalization as a cost-cutting strategy alternative to flexibilization (Pelegrìn and Bolancé,
2011; Capasso et al., 2013). This case is consistent with the firms’ own statements about the reasons
why they offshore, with the descriptive analysis of the data (Table 1), and with the lower relative
demand by offshoring firms for unskilled labor (Head and Ries, 2002; Hijzen et al., 2005; Becker et al.,15 As Benfratello et al. (2009), who also use data from the SMF, we are not able to control for firm’s productivity. However,
we test the robustness of our findings across alternative specification of the model, see the Appendix.
16 This number is not far from the data reported by Barba Navaretti et al. (2011a) using EFIGE data referred to 2008,
according to which 6.2% of Italian firms were involved in international outsourcing or FDIs.
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Table 1
Variables’ definitions and descriptive statistics.
Variables Description Mean # obs.
Dependent variable
OFFSHORING2006 (0,1) Dummy equal to one if the firm has declared to perform abroad part of his
activities in 2006, zero otherwise.
0.090 926
OFFSHORING2006 T-test
Explanatory variables Yes No (one tail)
OFFSHORING2003 (0,1) Dummy equal to one if the firm has declared to perform abroad part of
his activities in 2003, zero otherwise.
0.365 0.069 *** 926
TEMPORARY2003 Share of fixed-term direct-hire employees over total dependent employees, in 2003. 0.017 0.041 ** 926
TEMPORARY & PROJECT2003 Share of fixed-term direct-hire employees and project workers over total
dependent employees, in 2003.
0.042 0.080 ** 916
EXPORT2003 (0,1) Dummy equal to one if the firm exported abroad part of his production in 2003,
zero otherwise.
0.906 0.806 ** 926
INNOVATION2003 (0,1) Dummy equal to one if the firm has introduced a product and/or process
innovation in the period 2001-2003, zero otherwise.
0.659 0.644 926
SIZE2003 Logarithm of the number of employees, excluding term contract workers, in 2003. 4.781 4.354 *** 926
SKILL INTENSITY2003 Share of white collars employees over the total number of employees, in 2003. 0.377 0.329 *** 926
NEGATIVE SALES2003 (0,1) Dummy equal to one if the firm has a negative variation in sales between 2005 and 2003 0.447 0.341 ** 926
AGE2003 Logarithm of firm’s years since inception, in 2003. 3.182 3.176 909
CREDIT RATIONED2003 Dummy equal to one if the firm has applied to bank credit but its request
has been declined, in 2003, zero otherwise.
0.106 0.126 ** 919
MULTIPLE LENDING2003 The number of banks with which the firm does business, in 2003. 7.612 6.296
*** 920
FAMILY FIRM2006 Dummy equal to one if the firm is family owned, in 2006, zero otherwise. 0.639 0.623 915
GROUP2003 Dummy equal to one if the firm is part of a business group, in 2003, zero otherwise. 0.506 0.352
*** 925
R&D INVESTMENT2003 Dummy equal to one if the firm made, in 2001-2003, expenditures for R&D
activities, zero otherwise.
0.671 0.542 *** 924
Instrumental variables
TEMPORARY PROV Share of temporary workers (fixed-term dependent employees and project
workers) over the total dependent employees, at the provincial level, in 2002.
Source: Italian Social Security Administration (INPS)
0.157 94
MIGRANTS PROV Share of foreign resident population over total resident population at the provincial
level in 2002. Source: Italian Statistical Office (ISTAT).
0.013 94
Notes: our elaboration on Survey on Manufacturing Firm (SMF) data, IX and X waves. The third and fourth columns report the average values of the explanatory variables (by row) for firms that,
respectively, are offshorers and do not delocalize in 2006 (OFFSHORING2006). The fifth column reports the p-value of a (one-sided) t-test of a mean-comparison test. Data on instrumental variables
originally refer to the 103 Italian administrative provinces, as were in 2002, but actual figures are based on 94 provinces, since provinces are aggregated to the old classification of 95 provinces and one
province (Enna) is not represented in the final SMF data set used in the analysis.
*Significant at 10%.
nn Significant at 5%.
nnn Significant at 1%.
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A.F. Presbitero et al. / International Economics ] (]]]]) ]]]–]]]82012), where temporary workers are relatively more present. Under this scenario, the OLS estimates
would be negatively biased. Second, it is possible that both offshoring and labor force flexibility are
jointly driven by other unobserved factors, such as the degree of market competition.
To address these problems we rely on IV techniques. In absence of firm-level variables which could
affect the composition of the labor force, but not the decision to delocalize part of the production, we
instrument the share of temporary workers with aggregate measures of labor flexibility at the
provincial level. This choice is motivated by the fact that aggregate indicators are likely to be
exogenous with respect to firm-specific offshoring status. A similar strategy is followed by Jabbour
(2013), who identifies the effect of productivity on the likelihood to outsource in a sample of French
firms taking industry-level variables as instruments for the firm-specific level of productivity.
In particular, we instrument TEMPORARY with: (1) the share of temporary over total dependent
employees at the provincial level in 2002 (TEMPORARY PROV)17 and (2) the share of foreign resident
population over total resident population at the provincial level in 2002 (MIGRANTS PROV).
Relevance of the TEMPORARY PROV instrument is based on the hypothesis that the more
widespread are temporary contracts in the local labor market (which we measure at the provincial
level), the more likely it is that the strategy of employing cheap and flexible domestic labor force is
perceived as viable by an individual firm. As a mental experiment, suppose that the local labor market
was made only of permanent (open-ended) workers: if a firm opened a new vacancy for a temporary
job, that vacancy would probably remained unfilled, or it would be filled only at a higher wage
(disgruntlement by unions could also be stronger). Also, dualization of the labor force as measured by
the persistence in the type of contract workers can get in the labor market (Berton et al., 2011) implies
that a higher share of temporary workers is equivalent to a larger pool fromwhich firms can fish. The
fact that the instrument is measured in 2002 and the firm’s share of temporary workers refers to 2003
reinforces its relevance. On the other hand, the exogeneity of TEMPORARY PROV is based on the level of
aggregation and on the time lag between the year when the provincial share is measured and the year
in which we observe the firm’s offshoring status: we deem it unlikely that the delocalization strategy
and the employment policy of an individual firm affect the share of temporary workers in the whole
province, considering all sectors.18
Similar considerations can be made for the provincial share of migrants. Its relevance is based on
the fact that migrants are more likely to hold an open-ended job with respect to natives: 72.0% versus
64.8% among dependent employment (Fondazione Moressa, 2011).19 Hence, firms would be more
likely to assume temporary workers, other things equal, in provinces where migrants are less present
than in provinces where the share of migrants is higher. However, the exogeneity assumption is more
challenging, as migrants could be substitute for offshoring (Ottaviano et al., 2013) and their presence
in the province could allow firms to reduce their labor cost and overcome the fixed cost of offshoring.
A first insight about the validity of MIGRANTS PROV as instrument is its very low correlation with the
share of offshoring firms at provincial level (0.04, not statistically significant). In addition, as for
TEMPORARY PROV, the choice of measuring the variable at the provincial level and the timing
attenuate the potential endogeneity of the provincial share of migrants. In particular, the number of
foreign residents started increasing significantly since 2003 after a change of immigration policies in
Italy that occurred in September 2002, making unlikely that the share of migrants in the province in
2002 affects the firm’ future decision to offshore in 2006.
We are aware of the concerns about the potential weakness and invalidity of the instruments,
especially when they are not grounded in a solid theoretical framework, as in our case (Bazzi and17 Italian Social Security Administration (INPS) data. We thank Fabio Berton for providing the computation.
18 The small dimension of Italian firms, with respect to international standards for developed countries, reinforces the
argument. Our sample is made for 87% by small and medium-sized enterprises and the three largest firms in each province
account, on average for less than 30% of total and temporary employment. In addition, the correlation between TEMPORARY
PROV and the share of offshorers at the provincial level in 2006 is quite low (0.12) and not statistically significant, suggesting
that the instrument can be safely considered as exogenous. However, in the robustness section we run two exercises to control
for the possibility that the delocalization strategy of individual firms affects the labor force composition at the provincial level
(see the Appendix).
19 This is also due to a higher incidence of irregular work among immigrants, which partly substitutes temporary
employment.
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provided above, testing the statistical validity of the instruments in our empirical analysis. In
particular, the choice of having two separate instruments allows us to explicitly test the hypothesis
that the instruments do not belong to the offshoring equation. In Appendix, we further deepen the
discussion of the IV strategy, as part of our robustness analysis.
Our preferred specification is a linear probability model estimated by two-stage least squares
(2SLS), which has the advantage of providing diagnostic tests for over-identifying restrictions, under-
identification, and weak identification.21 Additionally, we report the results of the estimation of a
probit model with endogenous regressors by maximum likelihood.4. Results
The main results of the estimation of Eq. (1) are reported in Table 2. The OLS and the probit
estimates (columns 1 and 2) confirm the negative correlation between labor flexibility and offshoring,
as shown in Fig. 1. This negative correlation is coherent with the evidence about offshoring
determining an increase in the demand for skilled labor and a decrease in the demand for unskilled
labor, given that temporary jobs are more associated with unskilled labor.22
However, once we take into account the possible endogeneity of the labor force composition, the
coefficient on TEMPORARY becomes positive but it is no more statistically significant (columns 4 and
6). This result lends support to the presence of a negative bias of the OLS, consistent with offshoring
firms reducing the demand for unskilled labor. Hence, the negative correlation between labor force
flexibility and the subsequent propensity to offshore does not imply a causal link going from the
former to the latter, neither the presence of a substitution effect between labor flexibility and
offshoring. More formally, the IV estimates do not reject the null hypothesis that labor flexibility has
no effect on the propensity to offshoring.
The first stage regressions and a battery of diagnostic tests suggest that the model is not mis-
specified. The first stage regressions of the 2SLS (column 3) and probit model with endogenous
regressors (column 5) show that the instruments are strongly correlated with the endogenous
variables. The share of temporary workers in the province and the share of migrants in the total
provincial population are, respectively, positively and negatively correlated with TEMPORARY, as
expected. Coming to the 2SLS diagnostic tests, the Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald F-statistic is equal to 9.0,
very close to the Staiger and Stock (1997) rule of thumb value of 10, and between the Stock and Yogo
(2005) 5% critical values for 10% and 15% maximum bias. This is evidence against the risk of a weakly
identified model. The instruments satisfy the rank condition, since the Kleibergen–Paap rk LM statistic
rejects the null hypothesis that the equation is underidentified. Finally, the exclusion restrictions are
satisfied, since the Sargan–Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (OIR) does not reject the null
hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term.
The control variables are generally significant and with the expected signs. The fragmentation of
production is a long-term strategy: the probability to offshoring in 2006 is 25 percent higher for firms
which have already delocalized their production process in 2003 than for firms which produced only20 We tried several different variables – at firm, industry, and provincial level – which may be candidate for being good
instruments. In particular, we used firms’ age, a dummy for firms which fired at least one employee in 2003, the share of
temporary workers at regional and industry (2-digit) level, the provincial youth unemployment rate, a provincial measure of
human capital stock, the ratio of labor force aged 15–34 over labor force aged 35–64 at the provincial level, the provincial
participation rates in the labor market of individuals aged 15–24, 15–34 and 25–34. All these variables proved to be bad
instruments, either because they do not satisfy the relevance or the exogeneity conditions.
21 The Sargan–Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (OIR) tests the null hypothesis that the instruments are
uncorrelated with the error term. The Kleibergen–Paap rk LM statistic tests the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments
are not correlated with the endogenous regressors (i.e. the equation is underidentified). The Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald F-
statistic tests for weak identification (Baum et al., 2010).
22 In 2003, the year when we measure employment composition, 60.5% of temporary workers had less than secondary
education, against 41.6% of workers with an open-ended contract; 6.7% of temporary workers hold a university degree, against
12.5% of workers with an open-ended contract (Italian Labor Force Survey data).
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statistics (Table 1) and with the literature pointing out the fixed costs of delocalization (Tomiura,
2005; Dìaz-Mora, 2008; Hyun, 2010; Jabbour, 2013).23
While firm size is usually a good predictor of firm’s internationalization, the coefficient on SIZE is
significant only in the probit models, while not in the OLS and 2SLS estimates. This result, in line with
the findings of Cusmano et al. (2010), may be due to the presence of the lagged OFFSHORING variable,
since firm size is likely to be (almost) time invariant. In fact, in a static model the coefficient on SIZE is
highly significant in all specifications (see the Appendix).
Offshoring is more likely to occur for firms with a larger share of white collars, consistently with a
greater presence of offshoring among firms in skill-intensive sectors (Dìaz-Mora, 2008; Cusmano
et al., 2010; Pelegrìn and Bolancé, 2011; Corcos et al., 2013). In addition, the choice to delocalize is
more frequent among firms who were experiencing a negative performance in terms of sales,
suggesting that offshoring may be driven by the need to reduce production costs to gain
competitiveness.
In contrast with the main finding discussed by the firms’ internationalization literature (Tomiura,
2005; Dìaz-Mora, 2008; Barba Navaretti et al., 2008; Hyun, 2010; Cusmano et al., 2010), export-
oriented and innovative firms are not statistically more likely to delocalize the production process
than other firms. However, when considering contemporaneous rather than lagged values, we again
find evidence supporting the stylized facts that exporting and innovative firms are more likely to
offshore than firms which sell all their production in Italy and do not introduce product or process
innovations.24
In the online Appendix we show a battery of additional exercises to test the validity of our main
findings. In particular, results are robust to: (1) the estimation of a static version of Eq. (1) excluding
OFFSHORING2003, which should be less subject to autocorrelation problems in the error term; (2) an
alternative definition of TEMPORARY, including also project workers; (3) the inclusion of a series of
additional control variables, potentially correlated with the offshoring decisions (i.e. firm’s age, a
dummy for credit rationed firms, the number of banking relationships, a dummy for investment in
R&D as alternative measure of innovation, a dummy for firms belonging to groups, a dummy for family
owned businesses); (4) the inclusion of regional dummies; (5) the distinction between low- and high-
tech industries; (6) the exclusion of influential provinces and large firms, whose offshoring strategies
may affect the local demand for temporary workers; and (7) an IV estimationwith exact identification,
in which we allow for a slight relaxation of the exclusion restriction.5. Concluding remarks
The fragmentation of production processes and an increasing flexibility of the labor force are two
growing features of the global economy. As the initial quotation suggests, the threat of delocalization
is often used in policy circles to promote labor market reforms. In this paper, we take Italy as a
representative case study to assess whether the use of a more flexible labor force is indeed a
substitute to offshoring, or whether it further enhances delocalization. Firms engaging in offshoring
are generally moved by cost-savings reasons and by the necessity to be closer to new potential
markets. The replacement of permanent with temporary workers, made possible by recent legislative
reforms in the Italian labor markets, could partially offset the potential advantages of offshoring,
reducing in particular dismissal costs and increasing numerical flexibility. Alternatively, a more
flexible occupational mix could make it easier to substitute domestic with foreign labor, making easier
to firms to reap the potential benefits of offshoring opportunities.
The estimation of a model aimed at explaining the firm’s propensity to offshore, based on a
representative sample of Italian manufacturers, shows that there is a negative correlation between23 Jabbour (2013), in particular, uses panel data to uncover that current outsourcing critically depends on past outsourcing;
the decision to relocate part of the production process being a long-term strategy because of the associated fixed-costs.
24 Results are not shown for the sake of brevity, but they are discussed in a previous version of the paper (Presbitero et al.,
2012).
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Table 2
Regression results: dynamic model.
Dep. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OFFSHORING2006 OLS PROBIT 1st stage 2SLS 1st stage IVPROBIT
OFFSHORING2003 0.258*** 0.986*** 0.022 0.253*** 0.022 0.859***
[0.048] [0.164] [0.015] [0.052] [0.015] [0.275]
EXPORT2003 0.028 0.302 0.007 0.026 0.007 0.263
[0.022] [0.234] [0.011] [0.023] [0.011] [0.269]
INNOVATION2003 0.017 0.096 0.005 0.018 0.005 0.099
[0.015] [0.096] [0.009] [0.015] [0.009] [0.077]
SKILL INTENSITY2003 0.101* 0.746** 0.049** 0.112* 0.049*** 0.850***
[0.053] [0.292] [0.018] [0.059] [0.018] [0.264]
SIZE2003 0.014 0.121** 0.004 0.015 0.004 0.126***
[0.010] [0.050] [0.003] [0.009] [0.003] [0.046]
NEGATIVE SALES2003 0.032* 0.235*** 0.003 0.032** 0.003 0.215*
[0.016] [0.089] [0.011] [0.015] [0.011] [0.114]
TEMPORARY2003 0.146*** 2.262*** 0.086 0.874
[0.034] [0.582] [0.540] [3.216]
MIGRANTS PROV 1.030** 1.095***
[0.428] [0.370]
TEMPORARY PROV 0.439*** 0.435***
[0.104] [0.107]
Observations 926 926 926 926 926 926
R2 0.111 0.026 0.080
Overidentification 0.497
Underidentification 0.059
Weak instrument 8.980
Notes: The table reports the coefficients and, in brackets, the associated standard errors clustered by region. At the bottom of
the table we report some diagnostic tests. In particular, for the 2SLS we report the p-value of: (1) the Sargan-Hansen test of
overidentifying restrictions (OIR) testing the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term; (2) the
Kleibergen–Paap rk LM-statistic testing the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are not correlated with the
endogenous regressor; and (3) the Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald F-statistic testing for weak identification. All regressions include
macro-area x industry dummies, and a constant, not shown for reasons of space.
n Significant at 10%.
nn Significant at 5%.
nnn Significant at 1%.
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complements. However, the OLS estimates are likely to be negatively biased. The cost-saving
strategies driving offshoring firms reduce the relative demand for unskilled tasks, where temporary
jobs are concentrated, and may introduce a negative correlation between the current labor force
composition and the future delocalization choice. Once we control for the endogeneity of the share of
temporary workers and for spurious correlation, we find that the share of temporary workers does no
more contribute to explain the firms’ propensity to offshoring. This means that the negative
correlation between labor flexibility and subsequent delocalization observed in the data (Fig. 1)
cannot be interpreted as causation. More precisely, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that labor
flexibility has no effect on the propensity to offshoring. We test the validity of our results using the
Kraay’s (2012) Bayesian approach to build confidence intervals for instrumental variable regressions
with weak exclusion restrictions. While we recognize that our paper does not provide a definitive
result, we believe it significantly contributes to the literature and to the policy discussion.
In conclusions, our results suggest that, on the basis of the available evidence, we should not
bother too much about the interaction between labor force flexibility and offshoring decisions, though
we have to leave to future research the question whether the opposed theoretical mechanisms at
work (smaller delocalization costs and less union opposition to offshoring, but also lower cost saving
opportunities with a higher share of temporary workers) are too weak or compensate each other. An
implication of our research is that political support for labor market reforms aimed at further
liberalizing the labor market should not be sought after on the implicit threat that firms wouldPlease cite this article as: Presbitero AF, et al. Is labor flexibility a substitute to offshoring? Evidence
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A.F. Presbitero et al. / International Economics ] (]]]]) ]]]–]]]12otherwise relocate their production abroad. According to our estimates, a solid argument that labor
flexibility and offshoring are substitutes has still to be made.Acknowledgments
The authors thank Nicola Coniglio (the editor), two anonymous referees, Luigi Benfratello, Matteo
Picchio, Stefano Staffolani, Alberto Zazzaro and participants to the workshop “I cambiamenti della
manifattura italiana visti attraverso l’indagine Unicredit” (Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano, 2010), to the
51st annual meeting of the Italian Economic Association (Catania, 2010), to the ITSG international
workshop (Trento, 2012), and to the AIEL-ITSG Conference on “International trade and labor markets”
(Padova, 2013) for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. The views expressed herein
are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its
management.Appendix A. Supporting information
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the online version at http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.inteco.2014.07.004.References
Antras P. Firms, contracts, and trade structure. Q J Econ 2003;118(4):1375–18.
Barba Navaretti, G, Bugamelli, M, Schivardi, F, Altomonte, C, Horgos, D, Maggioni D. The global operations of European firms –
the second EFIGE policy report. Bruegel blueprint series, no. 12; 2011a.
Barba Navaretti G, Bertola G, Sembenelli A. Offshoring and immigrant employment: firm-level theory and evidence. CEPR
discussion papers, no. 6743; 2011b.
Barkbu B, Rahman J, Valdés R.. Fostering growth in Europe now. IMF staff discussion note no. 12/17; 2012.
Baum CF, Schaffer ME, Stillman S. ivreg2: stata module for extended instrumental variables/2SLS, GMM and AC/HAC, LIML and
k-class regression. Technical report; 2010. Available online at: 〈ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s425401.html〉.
Bazzi S, Clemens MA. Blunt instruments: avoiding common pitfalls in identifying the causes of economic growth. Am Econ J
Macroecon 2013;5(2):152–86.
Becker SO, Ekholm K, Muendler M-A. Offshoring and the onshore composition of tasks and skills. J Int Econ 2012;90(1):91–106.
Benfratello L, Razzolini T, Sembenelli A. Does ICT investment spur or hamper offshoring? Empirical evidence from microdata.
Development Working Papers 276, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano; 2009.
Berton F, Devicienti F, Pacelli L. Are temporary jobs a port of entry into permanent employment? Evidence from matched
employer–employee data. Int J Manpower 2011;32(8):879–99.
Berton F, Richiardi M, Sacchi S. The political economy of work security and flexibility: Italy in comparative perspective. Bristol:
Policy Press; 2012.
Broccolini C, Lo Turco A, Presbitero AF, Staffolani S. Individual earnings, international outsourcing and technological change. Int
Econ J 2011;25(1):29–46.
Capasso M, Cusmano L, Morrison A. The determinants of outsourcing and offshoring strategies in industrial districts: evidence
from Italy. Reg Stud 2013;47(4):465–79.
Corcos G, Irac DM, Mion G, Verdier T. The determinants of intrafirm trade: evidence from French firms. Rev Econ Stat 2013;95
(3):825–38.
Crinò R. Offshoring, multinationals and labour market: a review of the empirical literature. J Econ Surv 2009;23(2):197–249.
Cusmano L, Mancusi ML, Morrison A. Globalization of production and innovation: how outsourcing is reshaping an advanced
manufacturing area. Reg Stud 2010;44(3):235–52.
Daveri F, Jona-Lasinio C. Off-shoring and productivity growth in the Italian manufacturing industries. CESifo Econ Stud 2008;54
(3):414–50.
Defever F, Toubal F. Productivity, relationship-specific inputs and the sourcing modes of multinationals. J Econ Behav Organ
2013;94:345–57.
Dìaz-Mora C. What factors determine the outsourcing intensity? A dynamic panel data approach for manufacturing industries.
Appl Econ 2008;40(19):2509–21.
Disdier AC, Mayer T. How different is eastern Europe? Structure and determinants of location choices by french firms in eastern
and western Europe. J Comp Econ 2004;32:280–96.
Dolado JJ, Ortigueira S, Stucchi R. Does dual employment protection affect TFP? Evidence from Spanish manufacturing firms,
CEPR Discussion Papers 8763; 2012.
Esping-Andersen G, Regini M, editors. Why deregulate labour markets?Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2000.
European Commission. Employment in Europe, 2010 ed. Luxembourg: Publication Office of the European Union; 2011.
Feenstra RC, Hanson GH. Globalization, outsourcing, and wage inequality. Am Econ Rev 1996;86(2):240–5.Please cite this article as: Presbitero AF, et al. Is labor flexibility a substitute to offshoring? Evidence
from Italian manufacturing. International Economics (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
inteco.2014.07.004
A.F. Presbitero et al. / International Economics ] (]]]]) ]]]–]]] 13Feenstra RC, Hanson GH. The impact of outsourcing and high-technology capital on wages: estimates for the United States,
1979–1990. Q J Econ 1999;114(3):907–40.
Fischer JAV, Somogyi F. Globalization and protection of employment. MPRA paper no. 39426; 2012.
Fondazione Moressa. La condizione occupazionale dei giovani stranieri. Mestre: Fondazione Moressa; 2011.
Geishecker I. The impact of international outsourcing on individual employment security: a micro-level analysis. Labour Econ
2008;15(3):291–14.
Gereffi G. International trade and industrial upgrading in the apparel commodity chain. J Int Econ 1999;48(1):37–60.
Girma S, Gorg H. Outsourcing, foreign ownership, and productivity: evidence from UK establishment-level data. Rev Int Econ
2004;12(5):817–32.
Görg H, Hanley A, Strobl E. Productivity effects of international outsourcing: evidence from plant-level data. Can J Econ 2008;41
(2):670–88.
Görg, H, Görlich, D. Offshoring, wages and job security of temporary workers. IZA discussion paper, no. 6897; 2012.
Grossman GM, Rossi-Hansberg E. Trading tasks: a simple theory of offshoring. Am Econ Rev 2008;98(5):1978–97.
Head K, Ries J. Offshore production and skill upgrading by Japanese manufacturing firms. J Int Econ 2002;58(1):
81–105.
Hijzen A, Görg H, Hine RC. International outsourcing and the skill structure of labour demand in the United Kingdom. Econ J
2005;115(506):860–78.
Hijzen A, Inui T, Todo Y. Does offshoring pay? Firm-level evidence from Japan. Econ Inq 2010;48(4):880–95.
Holl A. Production subcontracting and location. Reg Sci Urban Econ 2008;38(3):299–309.
Hyun H-J. Firm heterogeneity in the choice of offshoring: evidence from Korean manufacturing firms. Asian Econ Pap 2010;9(1):
157–78.
Jabbour L. Offshoring and firm performance: evidence from french manufacturing industry. World Econ 2010;33(3):507–24.
Jabbour L. ‘Slicing the value chain’ internationally: empirical evidence on the offshoring strategy by French firms. World Econ
2012;35(11):1417–47.
Jabbour L. Market thickness, sunk costs, productivity, and the outsourcing decision: an empirical analysis of manufacturing
firms in France. Can J Econ 2013;46(1):103–34.
Jahn EJ. Reassessing the pay gap for temps in Germany. J Econ Stat 2008;230:208–33.
Kraay A. Instrumental variables regressions with uncertain exclusion restrictions: a Bayesian approach. J Appl Econom 2012;27
(1):108–28.
IMF. Euro area policies: 2012 article IV consultation. IMF country report no. 12/181; 2012.
Lo Turco A, Maggioni D, Picchio. Offshoring and job stability: evidence from Italian manufacturing. Struct Change Econ Dyn
2013;26:27–46.
Lotti F, Viviano E. Temporary workers, uncertainty and productivity. Paper available at 〈http://www.sole-jole.org/13112.pdf〉;
2012.
Machikita T, Sato H. Temporary jobs and globalization: evidence from Japan. RIETI discussion paper series, no. 11-E-029; 2011.
Matsuura, T, Sato, H, Wakasugi, R. Temporary workers, permanent workers, and international trade: evidence from Japanese
firm-level data. RIETI discussion paper series, no. 11-E-30; 2011.
Marin D. A new international division of labor in Europe: outsourcing and offshoring to eastern Europe. J Eur Econ Assoc 2006;4
(2–3):612–22.
Mitra D, Ranjan P. Offshoring and unemployment: the role of search frictions labor mobility. J Int Econ 2010;81(2):
219–29.
Oberst M, Schank T, Schnabel C. Interne Arbeitsmärkte und Einsatz temporärer Arbeitsverhältniss: Eine Fallstudie mit Daten
eines deutschen Dienstleistungsunternehmens. Z Betriebswirtsch 2007;77(11):1–19.
OECD. Offshoring and employment: trends and impact. Paris: OECD Publishing; 2007.
OECD. Measuring globalisation: OECD economic globalisation indicators. Paris: OECD Publishing; 2010.
OECD. Economic policy reforms 2012: going for growth. Paris: OECD Publishing; 2012.
Ottaviano G, Peri G, Wright GC. Immigration, offshoring, and American jobs. Am Econ Rev 2013;103(5):1925–59.
Pelegrìn A, Bolancé C. Offshoring and company characteristics: some evidence from the analysis of Spanish firm data. Institut
d’Economia de Barcelona working papers no. 2011/16; 2011.
Portugal P, Varejão J. Why do firms use fixed-term contracts? IZA discussion paper series no. 4380; 2009.
Presbitero AF, Richiardi MG, Amighini A. Is labor flexibility a substitute to offshoring? Evidence from Italian manufacturing.
MoFiR working paper, no. 72; 2012.
Quélin B, Duhamel F. Bringing together strategic outsourcing and corporate strategy: outsourcing motives and risks. Eur Manag
J 2003;21(5):647–61.
Sapir A. Globalisation and the reform of European social models. J Common Market Stud 2006;44(2):369–90.
Sensen MZ. The effects of offshoring on the elasticity of labor demand. J Int Econ 2010;81(1):89–98.
Staiger D, Stock JH. Instrumental variables regression with weak instruments. Econometrica 1997;65(3):557–86.
Stock JH, Yogo M. Testing for weak instruments in linear IV regression. (chapter 5). In: Andrews DWK, Stock JH, editors.
Identification and inference for econometric models: essays in honor of Thomas Rothenberg. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press; 2005. p. 80–108.
Tomiura E. Foreign outsourcing and firm-level characteristics: evidence form Japanese manufacturers. J Jpn Int Econ 2005;19
(2):255–71.
Tomiura E, Ito B, Wakasugi R. Offshoring outsourcing and production workers: firm-level relationships disaggregated by skills
and suppliers. World Econ 2013;36(2):180–93.
Yeaple S. Offshoring, foreign direct investment and the structure of US trade. J Eur Econ Assoc 2006;4(2–3):602–11.Please cite this article as: Presbitero AF, et al. Is labor flexibility a substitute to offshoring? Evidence
from Italian manufacturing. International Economics (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
inteco.2014.07.004
